Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Brain states: In philosophy, "brain state" refers to the specific configuration and activity of neurons and synapses at a given moment, corresponding to mental experiences and functions. See also Brain, Thinking, Consciousness, Experiences._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Brain/Brain State - Dictionary of Arguments
II 217 Brain State/Mental State/Meaning/Thinking/Wittgenstein: there is no brain state for which the words stand. Knowledge is not a certain brain state. Remembering is not a certain brain state. - Example: William James: "We are sad because we cry". >Memory, >Knowledge. II 217 Brain State/Mental State/Meaning/Thinking/Wittgenstein: often philosophy wrongly assumes that there is a special brain state for which a word stands. >Words. These difficulties decrease the further you move away from the mental states and move on to the activities. It is not a certain brain state that plays a role in knowledge. The same applies to remembering. For example, compare this with William James' observation that we are "sad because we cry" that crying is not an insignificant accompaniment to an amorphous state. II 218 Brain State/Mental State/Intention/Wittgenstein: intention is often maintained for a particular brain state. Is it an empirical context? For the intention to sing "A", one must know what one intends to do, for there is no further evidence here of the kind "this state of mind was often followed by A". In the usual sense, however, intending and what one is willing to do are in no such context. There does not seem to be a link here. II 219 The intention should already contain the action in itself. The intention to sing a song should be as accessible as singing for oneself. Here there is still a transition from silence to singing, which has to be carried out first. >Intentions. There is a very big difference between preparing to do this or that and what is to be done. But what does one have to do with the other if the preparation is different from what you are preparing for? ((s) See also Plan/Tinbergen.) II 220 But that we are preparing ourselves is not a hypothesis. We are not saying we believe we are preparing for it. When you prepare a workpiece, there is no such confusion. II 221 Expectation: the wrong conclusion we are tempted to draw is the thought that we only know what we expect when the expected has already happened. But you can also prepare to sing without really doing it._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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